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Civil Society and the Bosnian Police Certification Process: Challenging ‘the 
Guardians’ 
 
Gemma Collantes-Celador (City University London) 
 
 
This chapter focuses on a very particular aspect of the democratic reform of police forces that took 
place in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts.i It provides an 
account of the ‘certification process’ - or vetting - of all police officers, carried out by the UN Mission 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the International Police Task Force (IPTF). This process, 
which officially was completed at the end of 2002 when the United Nations (UN) mission left the 
country, was kept alive - at least in part - by the activities of two groups (Association of Decertified 
Policemen of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska Association of 
Decertified Policemen), which contested the outcome of the process on the basis that it suffered from 
operational and, more importantly, structural shortcomings. In other words, they considered that the 
process had been undemocratic and its outcomes were having adverse repercussions for the rights of 
decertified police officers. The two associations engaged in a legal battle and a political fight, for the 
policy and related legislation to be changed. Their efforts failed to yield the desired response from 
national actors due to the powers enjoyed by the UN during its mission in Bosnia. However, the 
matter was referred to the UN Security Council, which ultimately was forced to overrule its policy of 
UN decisions being final and binding, and reach a negotiated solution.  
This episode is remarkable for what it tells us about the process of democratising police forces in 
post-conflict settings. Civil society actors play an important role in advancing and consolidating 
aspects related to the demilitarisation and accountability of police forces, by strengthening civil-
military relations while making the process more inclusive and legitimate. As Marina Caparini points 
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out, ‘it reminds us that in the final analysis the client of state security institutions is the individual 
citizen’.ii Civil society performs this role through three types of actions. First, it can be the source of 
information and knowledge on security and defence matters for both the public and policymakers and, 
thereby, can contribute to the shaping, implementation and acceptance of policies. Second, it can 
promote and facilitate wider participation in the process through public debate on security and 
defence matters (newspaper reporting, public meetings and so on), which also contributes to the 
development of reforms that are locally owned and locally sustainable. Third, civil society can hold 
security actors accountable for wrongdoing and malpractice by performing an external oversight 
role.iii It is this third type of action that best describes what was achieved by the two Associations of 
Decertified Policemen. In Bosnia this oversight was directed at both the Bosnian authorities and the 
UN, whose extensive powers drove the process of certification of police officers. Thus, the case study 
in this chapter sheds light on the ability of civil society in protectorate-style contexts to ‘guard the 
guardians’iv by holding them answerable for their actions using the values advocated in their original 
reforms. The analysis in this chapter contributes to the study of civil society activism in post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts by including in the state-civil society equation the relationship of the latter with 
international actors. At the same time, in evaluating the significance of what the two Associations of 
Decertified Policemen achieved through their actions, we consider also the ‘unintended’, but still 
potentially negative, consequences that these actions might or could have had on the legitimacy of the 
statebuilding project in Bosnia and the sustainability of other reforms introduced by the international 
community.v  
The chapter begins with an overview of civil society developments in post-conflict Bosnia. The 
assessment focuses on Bosnian Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), reflecting the tendency in 
the majority of the literature to centre on this category when discussing civil society more generally.vi 
However, the author understands civil society as a much wider concept encompassing other types of 
non-state actors that, as explained in the Introduction to this edited volume, shape political change 
through social activism. The two Associations of Decertified Policemen are not a typical example of 
civil society associations if we take into account that their members are private citizens who until 
This is the accepted pre-publication version of a book chapter that appears in Civil Society and Transitions in the 
Western Balkans, edited by V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic, J. Ker-Lindsay and D. Kostovicova, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.  
 
If you wish to cite it please consult the final published version for the correct pagination.  
 
3 
 
decertification were part of a key institution in the state administration. Moreover, they were assisted 
at various points in their political and legal campaigning by police trade unions. However, exploring 
the social activism of these two associations contributes to the existing literature on civil society 
activism in Bosnia, and in post-conflict scenarios more generally, by focusing on a non-NGO example 
where the outcomes of the process speak directly to the roles that have been associated with civil 
society promotion in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Moreover, due to the background of the 
members of these associations – as noted above – this case study allows us to reflect on what has been 
described, in the Introduction to this edited volume, as the blurred boundaries between state and 
society, public and private in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The chapter also provides a brief 
overview of the certification process (goals, rationale, modus operandi) with particular attention to the 
operational, but more importantly the structural problems used by the two associations as arguments 
to mobilise, politically and legally, post-2002.  
 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOSNIA  
 
The number of NGOs registered in Bosnia in 2008 is estimated at 12,189 - a remarkable figure if 
we take into account that Bosnia’s population at the time was approximately 4.5 million people.vii 
However, one should be cautious about drawing conclusions on the basis of these figures. First, as 
Adam Fagan has noted, there have been discrepancies between the official figures and actual numbers 
of active NGOs.viii Moreover, there seems to be no direct correlation between the number of NGOs 
and the consolidation of civic and democratic politics.ix Although the position and role of the NGO 
sector seems to have improved gradually in Bosnian society, this follows more than a decade of at 
best mixed and at worst ‘gloomy’ assessments. NGOs were meant to be at the forefront of the peace-
building efforts in Bosnia, acting as advocacy channels for the introduction of a locally-owned ‘new 
culture of interaction and political engagement based on compromise, tolerance and participation’ that 
would help delegitimise nationalist forces.x Their advocacy role was based on the assumption that, if 
provided with the necessary support in the areas of sustainability and capacity building, NGOs would 
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facilitate economic and political activity.xi Notwithstanding huge variation across the country, several 
shortcomings can be identified that have worked against the implementation of this vision of NGOs in 
Bosnia. These limitations include the sector’s dependence on external/foreign funds, the service-
oriented nature of much of its activities, and its impact on the Bosnian state. An additional, more 
fundamental stumbling block, which Steven Sampson has highlighted, is that the vision driving NGO 
development is a ‘model’ and, thus, a simplified representation of a Western reality or an idealised 
aspiration of what an NGO should be and should do.xii Roberto Belloni has argued along similar lines, 
pointing out that an idealised understanding of civil society becomes the more problematic when 
viewed against the actual structural, institutional and legal conditions (for example, ethnic divisions, 
corruption and cronyism, political fragmentation, the overarching powers of the international 
community, and so on) that have delimited in the years since the end of the war how Bosnian civic 
groups and organisations can work, a point also endorsed by Florian Bieber. In other words, ‘the 
development of a properly functioning civil society is inextricably intertwined with the creation of a 
responsive, accountable, and transparent state structure’.xiii We return to this issue later in the chapter 
when discussing the impact of the two Associations of Decertified Policemen on the statebuilding 
process in Bosnia.  
One of the most common criticisms attracted by evaluations of the NGO sector in Bosnia is its 
huge dependence on external funds for its survival. To some extent, such dependence is not 
unreasonable given the economic precariousness of the country since the end of the war. It is 
undeniable that foreign funds have been crucial for keeping alive many of these NGOs. However, 
judging from evaluations of the NGO situation in Bosnia, this dependence has carried a high cost. It 
has led to a number of ‘perverse’ anomalies in the role, functioning and positioning of NGOs in 
Bosnian society. Florian Bieber describes this as a ‘credibility gap’ in relation to local NGOs vis-à-vis 
local constituencies.xiv For instance, NGOs becoming more preoccupied with meeting the expectations 
of foreign donors than with prioritising the needs of the population, or those areas where there is 
capacity and willingness to establish governance partnerships with government offices and state 
agencies to continue with similar activities beyond the end of the project.xv The latter type of activity 
This is the accepted pre-publication version of a book chapter that appears in Civil Society and Transitions in the 
Western Balkans, edited by V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic, J. Ker-Lindsay and D. Kostovicova, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.  
 
If you wish to cite it please consult the final published version for the correct pagination.  
 
5 
 
is more conducive to developing sustainable, locally-owned processes of political, economic and 
social reconstruction. Vanessa Pupavac’s analysis of international gender policies in Bosnia, for 
example, shows that women’s NGOs reflect a pattern that has characterised other local NGOs; they 
are ‘essentially oriented towards the international community and reliant on its continuing 
sponsorship for their survival, and they evidence a rather weak relation to the population […] NGOs 
have failed to galvanise popular support among women and have moreover no formal accountability 
to the population, unlike elected representatives’.xvi The alternative – dependence on public revenues 
from local authorities – can be equally problematic. According to the 2010 NGO Sustainability Index 
issued by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), it seems that only 
politically non-threatening NGOs receive local financial support, a finding that begs the question of 
whether NGOs faced with decreasing funding from external donors might be forced to become ‘para-
state organisations’.xvii 
The apparent disconnect between NGOs and Bosnian society is explained – by many analysts – 
within a service provision approach encouraged by a pattern of foreign funding. The net result is 
NGOs that are technical, project-driven and apolitical, rather than advocacy actors engaged in 
mobilising the population according to non-nationalist political agendas.xviii In this context, the 
approach of the European Union (EU) is considered problematic in prioritising the capacity of NGOs 
to organise and manage projects.xix In addition to affecting the NGO-society relationship, this reality 
has impacted negatively on the Bosnian state. It has been pointed out that donors’ emphasis on service 
provision has meant that NGOs have often substituted for the state (or market) in a range of socio-
economic areas where state (or market) could not deliver. However necessary in the short-term, this 
has prompted accusations that the social contract between Bosnian citizens and the nascent post-
conflict state has been undermined. Two reasons are given. Firstly, the ‘siphoning’ off valuable 
personnel attracted by the higher salaries and better working conditions in the NGO sector and, 
secondly, the ‘appropriation’ of key services and functions normally associated with the state (or 
market).xx 
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Nevertheless, there is evidence of a gradual attenuation of the effects arising from the problems 
discussed so far. Cynthia Simmons points to several ‘victories’ from 2000 onwards that – on the basis 
of citizens’ initiatives – have afforded some local NGOs a greater monitoring presence in municipal 
council meetings and, in the case of Tuzla Canton, at the parliamentary level. She refers also to their 
cumulated actions for electoral reform and the inclusion of courses on political consciousness into 
public school curricula.xxi Similarly, the 2010 USAID NGO Sustainability Index finds evidence of 
NGOs’ capacity to interact and/or demand participation in decision making at the legislative level, 
due in part perhaps to the introduction of the 2006 rules on consultation during legislative drafting.xxii 
However, the USAID report adds that this consultative and advocacy capacity is insufficiently 
developed and ad hoc. The report highlights the exclusion of NGOs from crucially important political 
decisions such as the 2009 Butmir constitutional process between Bosnian political elites and the 
international community.xxiii NGOs also were unable to contribute to the Police Restructuring process 
(2004-2008), a major international effort to improve the transparency, accountability and cost-
effectiveness of the police by tackling the fragmentation of the law enforcement system. This police 
process has been described as ‘top-down’, or as ‘seeking grand deals among party bosses behind 
closed doors’ with no meaningful room for the involvement of NGOs or any other civil society 
actors.xxiv This is emblematic of a much wider trend in Bosnia of a generally limited involvement of 
civil society actors in police matters during both the UN and EU phases.xxv  
 
THE POLICE CERTIFICATION PROCESS 
 
In the period 1996 to 2002 the UNMIBH Human Rights Office and IPTF conducted a countrywide 
screening of all Bosnian police officers. Those not meeting the criteria were ‘deauthorised’ (or 
decertified) from membership of the police ranks; that is, they received a lifetime bar on holding any 
position within the Bosnian law enforcement agencies. Against the background of significant police 
involvement with various aspects of the conduct of the war, the aim of this certification process was 
to assist the democratisation of law enforcement by removing any military and criminal elements and 
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ensuring the police’s professionalism and accountability.xxvi This ‘new’ image of the police in a ‘new’ 
Bosnia was intended to bolster the process of reconciliation among communities and also between the 
state and society. The need for reform became clear during the immediate phases of the post-Dayton 
period when the police by and large continued to operate favouring their particular ethnic group, 
failing to respond to incidents of violence, intimidation and/or discrimination involving citizens from 
another ethnic group, or even perpetrating such acts.xxvii There was also an economic rationale. In the 
aftermath of the war there were too many police officers. Some downsizing was required to achieve 
reasonable numbers that would be more representative of police-population ratios and financially 
sustainable over the long term for an impoverished Bosnian state.  
The vetting process developed out of a range of agreements forged separately with the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska (RS) and Brčko District authorities, during 1996-98, 
and the gradually acquired institution building and restructuring powers of the UN presence in Bosnia. 
The UNMIBH/IPTF also had recourse to the Office of the High Representative (OHR)’s Bonn 
Powers in the effort to downsize the police force. The process was conducted in three stages, during 
which all police officers were checked against a range of criteria that constituted grounds for 
dismissal. The criteria included absence of valid education credentials and completion of 
UNMIBH/IPTF training, war crime convictions and criminal proceedings in the International 
Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or domestic courts, human rights violations prior to 
or during the screening process, violations of property laws, evidence of obstruction of IPTF policies 
and the responsibilities and obligations arising from the Dayton Peace Accords.xxviii Local authorities, 
in theory, were obliged to take action upon receiving the recommendations on screened police officers 
issued by UNMIBH/IPTF, including, where necessary, commencement or continuation of criminal 
investigations based on domestic criminal codes and laws on internal affairs.xxix  
There are no precise data on the number of officers that were decertified. The final UN Security 
Council report on UNMIBH, published in December 2002, refers to 481 decertifications and 228 
cases pending. The corresponding OHR figures are 687 with 37 cases pending, and the European 
Stability Initiative (ESI) evaluation of the process quotes 793 decertified officers including 150 
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pending cases.xxx Added to this, technical problems during the certification process have been used to 
call into question the reliability of the official Police Registry database where UNMIBH/IPTF stored 
the records and evidence required for the certification process.xxxi The quality of this database is one 
of the possible explanations for the fact that, even after the vetting process was officially concluded, 
the ranks of Bosnian police forces still included officers who fitted the criteria for decertification.xxxii 
There are still instances, even at the time of writing, of police officers investigated, arrested and/or 
prosecuted for war crimes and other crimes committed in the period prior to the police certification 
process.  
Of course, given the sheer numbers of officers to be inspected (44,000 according to the UN) and 
difficulties during the data gathering stages, the certification process was bound to be a very complex 
endeavour, with room for misjudgements and error. There were also a number of operational 
difficulties that added to the already complex nature of the process, including lack of preparation of 
some IPTF officers for the investigative tasks, and under-utilisation of domestic (including civil 
society) actors in the data gathering stages. To this can be added the attempted politicisation of the 
process by local authorities, who used it sometimes to wage war against opposing political factions. 
However, the main source of contention surrounding the certification process is related to its 
structural shortcomings, which contravened the spirit and the letter of the UNMIBH/IPTF´s 
assignment in Bosnia. Some police officers were decertified without explanation and unaware that 
they had been/were being investigated, or were denied the opportunity to appeal against the 
UNMIBH/IPTF charges (see below), or were in limbo with appeals unanswered when the UN mission 
departed. There were even more problematic cases of police officers that ‘fell in the middle [...] did 
not show up in any list’.xxxiii In other words, their names were not on the list of certified officers issued 
by the UNMIBH/IPTF to the police authorities, but they also had not received a notice of 
decertification. Because the certification process was not based on a Bosnian legal mechanism, but 
relied on UN Chapter VII authorisation, it was unclear how Bosnian law enforcement authorities 
should deal with this category of police officers, which left the final decision to their discretion.  
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Starting in mid-2002, decertified police officers were given eight days (down from 14 in earlier 
stages of the process) from the date the final non-certification order became effective, within which to 
apply in writing for reconsideration of the order. If the request for reconsideration was accepted by the 
UNMBIH Appeals Commission (composed of UN personnel, but independent of the IPTF 
Commissioner), the corresponding Bosnian law enforcement agency’s obligation to terminate the 
officer’s employment was automatically suspended until further notice.xxxiv Cases accepted for review 
were submitted to the IPTF Commissioner for reconsideration of his decision, but these were 
recommendations only and the Commissioner had the final word.xxxv The decertified police officers 
were required to prepare their appeals without access to the IPTF files or other evidence, and could 
not appear either in person or through a representative to give evidence to the Appeals Commission. 
Certification decisions were being issued up to the last day of the UNMIBH/IPTF mandate (31 
December 2002), evidence of the haste to complete the process, but resulting in there being no grace 
period for unfavourable decisions to be challenged.xxxvi The incoming European Union Police Mission 
(EUPM) took the position that it could take no action in this area because of its very different mandate 
and responsibilities. Its view was that the certification process was over. However, the letters received 
by decertified police officers in December 2002 appear to have stated that in case of an appeal the 
applicant should contact UNMIBH/IPTF or EUPM.xxxvii There are some very interesting questions to 
be asked about the agreement between UNMIBH/IPTF and EUPM on the follow-up to this issue. One 
such is regarding the fate of the official Police Registry database managed by UNMIBH/IPTF during 
the certification process. It is claimed that post-2002 there was no access to those UN records, which 
were taken to New York at the end of the Mission. However, it seems that, despite the EUPM’s stated 
determination not to become involved in this matter, UNMIBH/IPTF left an ‘unofficial’ copy of the 
database with the EUPM. The database – albeit with amendments and updates – was used by EUPM 
from 2004 to 2009 as a source of background information for some of its policies (ethnic and gender 
recruitment, career progression policies, etc.) and for the downsizing process foreseen by the Police 
Restructuring Process (2004-2008). It was used also to monitor certain police appointments, 
This is the accepted pre-publication version of a book chapter that appears in Civil Society and Transitions in the 
Western Balkans, edited by V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic, J. Ker-Lindsay and D. Kostovicova, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.  
 
If you wish to cite it please consult the final published version for the correct pagination.  
 
10 
 
sometimes at the request of the OHR, the EU-led military operation EUFOR Althea, and other 
international actors.xxxviii  
The August 2004 UN report on the rule of law and transitional justice mentions, crucially, that 
vetting of the police and prison services, the army and the judiciary, such as was carried out with UN 
assistance, should include elements that would distinguish the processes from ‘wholesale purges’. 
These ‘official’ vettings should include notification of the allegations against the parties under 
investigation with ‘reasonable notice’, provision of an opportunity to respond to or appeal against the 
allegations before the body carrying out the vetting process, and ‘the right to appeal an adverse 
decision’ in front of a court or any other independent body.xxxix Also, drawing on lessons learnt from 
previous missions, this UN report highlighted that legitimate vetting processes must be respectful of 
the ‘sensitivities of victims and of the human rights of those suspected of abuses’.xl These UN 
guidelines were issued over one and a half years after the end of the police certification process in 
Bosnia, but their marked contrast to the Bosnian case highlights the nature of the problem and 
questions the position adopted by the UN Security Council in the post-2002 period. This is not to say 
that all decertified police officers in Bosnia were innocent from the charges that led to their removal 
from the police ranks. Nor is one trying to underestimate the huge endeavour that providing every 
individual police officer with the right to recourse would have meant for the UN mission in Bosnia. It 
would have rendered a time-consuming and complex process even more difficult. However, adopting 
a modus operandi that denied individuals a ‘reasonable’ amount of time, and access to information, to 
gather the data necessary to contest any allegations, and the right to a fair trial, cast a shadow over the 
intended contribution of the vetting process to the development of democratic police forces.   
 
THE ASSOCIATIONS OF DECERTIFIED POLICEMEN 
 
Soon after UNMIBH/IPTF left Bosnia, a number of decertified police officers took their cases to 
the local courts (in March 2004 they numbered 150 and in 2006 were around 262).xli More 
importantly (and notwithstanding the debate over whether these courts had jurisdiction on the matter), 
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as early as 2003 some domestic courts had ruled that some decertified police officers should be 
reinstated into the police ranks. One of the arguments made at the time by these courts was that the 
dismissals were unlawful because Bosnian law did not include IPTF decisions as acceptable reasons 
for dismissal. Also, these courts pointed out that the police officers in question had not been given the 
right to seek legal remedy. The UN Security Council responded in June 2004 by calling on the 
Bosnian authorities to, 
 
ensure, including through the adoption or amendment of domestic legislation, that all 
IPTF certification decisions be fully and effectively implemented, that employment of 
persons who were denied certification by IPTF be terminated, and that such persons be 
precluded from employment, either now or in the future, in any position within any law 
enforcement agency in BiH.xlii  
 
A variety of reasons have been offered to explain this response, including the potential impact of this 
episode on the sustainability of the UN reform period in Bosnia as a whole, and fears of setting a 
precedent that might affect similar questions related to other previous missions and might damage the 
UN’s reputation. An alternative reading is to look at the possible bureaucratic and financial ‘impulses’ 
within the UN had a different position on this issue been taken.xliii Regardless of what motivated this 
position, and even if UN Security Council Presidential statements are not legally binding, the 
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina instructed all relevant authorities in the country to act in 
accordance with UNMIBH/IPTF certification decisions.xliv  
The Federation Association of Decertified Policemen and the RS Association of Decertified 
Policemen were founded respectively on 2 February 2004 and 31 January 2005. These two 
associations resembled in many ways pressure groups that mobilised to defend the rights of the 281 
former police officers they represented. Their ultimate objective was a review of the UNMIBH/IPTF 
decisions and re-instatement of police officers judged unjustifiably disqualified. These associations 
conducted legal and political battles lobbying for policy change and gained increasing sympathy from 
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the Bosnian public. Their efforts in Bosnia (mainly focused on Sarajevo) included a range of actions 
from peace protests, demonstrations and hunger strikes, to letters and petitions, media campaigns, 
meetings with international and Bosnian officials and the coordination of at least 157 applications to 
the European Court of Human Rights, according to European Stability Initiative data from 2007.xlv  
It would be farfetched to argue that the two Associations of Decertified Policemen, on their own, 
could have been successful in bringing about change. The OHR mainly, but also the Human Rights 
Commissioner of the Council of Europe, played significant mediating roles.xlvi Nevertheless, these 
associations were important in providing the initial drive. Among their successes at national level was 
the decision in 2006 by the Bosnian authorities to form a State Commission to investigate the claims 
of those decertified police officers that had taken their cases to Bosnian courts. While being careful 
not to undermine the authority of the UN, the Bosnian state was nevertheless enacting its 
responsibility to protect the human rights of Bosnian citizens. However, from its inception, the State 
Commission came under intense pressure from the OHR and certain Peace Implementation Council 
members, on the basis of concerns about the impact it could have on the UN legacy in Bosnia and 
other reform processes (to which we turn later in the chapter).xlvii Some local courts, the Ombudsman 
and the Human Rights Commission of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, joined in 
calls questioning whether the dismissals during the UN period complied with the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Similar criticisms emerged at the European level. The 
Council of Europe’s Venice Commission expressed concern about the lack of transparency and the 
integrity of the appeals system and recommended that the UN – not the Bosnian authorities – should 
set up an individual review process to look into the claims of the Associations of Decertified 
Policemen, without questioning the legitimacy of the whole process. This was supported by the then 
High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, but rejected by the UN. The Venice Commission emphasised 
that the certification process was for life and the socio-economic consequences for affected 
individuals were considerable (in terms of employment, but also reputation and standing in society 
especially if decertified on the grounds of war crimes or human rights violations). It ‘freed’ the 
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Bosnian state from any blame stating that it was bound to implement the UNMIBH/IPTF decisions as 
part of the powers granted by the Dayton Accords and subsequent UN decisions.xlviii  
The cumulative effect of these critical voices forced the UN Security Council, in April 2007, to 
find a negotiated solution to their initial policy that UN decisions on this matter could not be 
challenged. The solution arrived at referred to ‘improvements in the legal standards and practices for 
the recruitment and selection of police officers within BiH’xlix and, thus, allowed officers denied 
certification to apply as new recruits (not to be reinstated) for police job vacancies in accordance with 
existing Bosnian police laws. The only other condition was that they disclose their decertified status 
in any application. There has been much debate over the ‘compromise’ implied in this decision, which 
does not call into question the validity of the decision-making process during the certification process, 
does not acknowledge UN wrongdoing and uses very conservative language, perhaps in order to avoid 
setting a precedent. Some Bosnian political authorities – namely the then Minister of Human Rights 
and Refugees – tried to contest the April 2007 UN decision and proposed reinstatement of all those 
officers, but this effort came to nothing. The response from members of the Associations of 
Decertified Policemen ranged from ‘optimism’ to what a long-standing observer of Bosnian affairs 
described as ‘cautious satisfaction’.l There were also some whose response reportedly was immediate 
application for a police job, although the ongoing downsizing of the police forces to financially 
sustainable numbers casts some doubt – as pointed out by the European Stability Initiative – as to the 
number of vacancies that have become available since then.li  
The delay in implementing the UN decision overshadowed the importance of the abovementioned 
events and actions. Some commentators have blamed this on the confusion among Bosnian and 
international organisations about ‘how to effectively implement the new Security Council decision’.lii 
The Associations of Decertified Policemen, therefore, continued to act although less intensively, by 
organising peace protests and hunger strikes with the support of the police trade unions, to demand 
from the OHR, but also EUPM, a prompt resolution of this new obstacle. For the OHR, the problem 
lay with the State, Entity, Canton and Brčko District authorities as responsible actors for the 
legislative changes required to accommodate the new UN position. The OHR believed that the two 
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associations should be meeting with these Bosnian authorities.liii Draft model amendments were 
nevertheless prepared by OHR and EUPM to assist local authorities with the implementation of the 
UN Security Council President’s letter of April 2007, but it took over a year for the relevant 
authorities (with Republika Srpska taking longer) to complete the process.liv 
The Associations of Decertified Policemen played a role in the achievement of what had seemed 
impossible, forcing the UN to revise its position vis-à-vis an issue that had serious socio-economic 
repercussions for a specific group of Bosnian citizens. At the same time, not all the lessons from this 
story of civil society activism are positive. The manner in which the process evolved raises several 
still unanswered questions about the nature of the statebuilding process in Bosnia. Having the Bosnian 
authorities meet the original demands of the two Associations of Decertified Policemen (i.e. 
reinstatement of officers judged unjustifiably disqualified) could have further politicised police reform 
at a time when fresh attempts were being made to restructure Bosnia’s police system (the 2004-2008 
Police Restructuring Process). One cannot forget that there were instances, particularly in the early 
days, when local authorities did try to politicise the certification process in order to protect ‘their 
own’, while waging war against opposing political/ethnic factions. In other words, for reasons other 
than the goal of strengthening the statebuilding process in Bosnia. Accusations of political 
manipulation emerged as late as June 2008, from Raffi Gregorian, then Principal Deputy High 
Representative, who described as ‘shameful’ the attempt by politicians to feed false information about 
the OHR to these two Associations to mask ‘their failure’. One could interpret ‘their failure’ as 
referring to the compromise solution offered by the UN Security Council or the difficulties in 
implementing the new policy.lv  
The activities of the two Associations of Decertified Policemen could have set a dangerous 
precedent and/or reinvigorated challenges to other areas of the international statebuilding project that 
were bringing much needed change to the country, but on the basis of a similar exercise of very 
extensive powers (i.e. OHR’s Bonn Powers). In July 2006, Bosnia’s Constitutional Court reached a 
judgement that the use of Bonn Powers whereby elected officials could be dismissed by the High 
Representative with no right to appeal, and with a consequent deprivation of a number of civic rights, 
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went against the country’s constitutional commitment to uphold the right of all persons in Bosnia to 
protection under the European Convention of Human Rights. The Court reminded all affected parties 
that Bosnia’s international obligations to the OHR and UN ‘cannot determine the constitutional rights 
of people who are within the jurisdiction of Bosnia and Herzegovina’.lvi The Bosnian authorities faced 
a conundrum similar to the problems that surfaced during the certification process, of ‘a collision 
course’lvii involving either the Bosnian population or the international community. To return to the 
certification process, irrespective of whether the Bosnian legal and political institutions at the time 
had the capacity to review all contentious cases, solving the conundrum by curtailing the ability of 
those institutions to respond to the demands of the former police officers represented by the two 
associations (as well as others not members of these associations) may have satisfied claims about the 
country’s international obligations and fears of unravelling the whole certification process.lviii 
However, it raises important questions about the essence of the post-Dayton Bosnian state. It 
questions the legitimacy of the contractual relationship between state and society introduced by the 
international community. The Bosnian state showed limited capacity to fulfil the basic roles normally 
associated with ‘stateness’. That is, to ‘guarantee universal rights to its citizens, provide public goods, 
and implement coherent decisions despite potential competing interests’.lix In fact, the activities of the 
two associations and the mediating role played primarily by the OHR but also the Council of Europe, 
rather than the actions of the Bosnian state, were crucial for obtaining concessions in New York.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It cannot be denied that the certification process was a much needed reform in post-Dayton Bosnia 
given the role of the police forces during the war and in the immediate post-settlement phases.lx At the 
same time, the use of non-democratic means to achieve democratic progress within the institution of 
the police brought into play a number of ‘disturbing dynamics’ – to quote Marcus Cox – that were 
used by the two Associations of Decertified Policemen to mobilise legally and politically.lxi From a 
civil society point of view, the Associations of Decertified Policemen are a case study with important 
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lessons, even if the material interests that motivated their actions were very narrow in scope. These 
associations are a good example of the role that civil society activism can play as a form of external 
oversight to ensure transparency and accountability from decision makers, whether national or 
international, when wrongdoing is committed in the design and implementation of top-down policies. 
It illustrates also that despite the short-termism, ‘projectmania’lxii and service-orientation that seems to 
have predominated among NGOs in Bosnia, there is room for more engaged civil society actors in 
pursuit of inclusive and legitimate democratic reforms. At the same time, the fact that these 
associations were in some respects substituting for the state in defending the rights of a specific group 
of Bosnian citizens reveals ‘uncomfortable truths’ about the complexity of statebuilding in a context 
of a strong international presence and power, and weak local institutions. Describing the situation as a 
choice between ‘human rights or the wishes of international bureaucrats’lxiii may be an exaggerated 
description of the situation, but it does capture the dilemma during the certification process. The 
Bosnian state had a duty to respond to the needs of these citizens, but its exercise of that duty was 
hampered by the protectorate-style approach introduced since Dayton. This is what Bieber describes 
as the disempowering effects of overly interventionist methods.lxiv At the same time, that very 
protectorate-style approach has shielded many of the much needed reforms from the politicisation that 
could ultimately undermine nascent institutions in Bosnia. There seem to have been no substantive 
repercussions for the legitimacy of the Bosnian state arising from the post-2002 police certification 
events - perhaps, in part, due to the small size of the affected group. lxv Nevertheless, this episode of 
civil society activism raises important questions about the sustainability of the Bosnian statebuilding 
process as introduced by the international community.  
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